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DISCONTINUITY DESIGN USING PRINCIPAL STRATIFICATION
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Duke University‡ and University of Florence§
Regression discontinuity (RD) designs are often interpreted as local ran-
domized experiments: a RD design can be considered as a randomized ex-
periment for units with a realized value of a so-called forcing variable falling
around a pre-fixed threshold. Motivated by the evaluation of Italian univer-
sity grants, we consider a fuzzy RD design where the receipt of the treat-
ment is based on both eligibility criteria and a voluntary application sta-
tus. Resting on the fact that grant application and grant receipt statuses are
post-assignment (post-eligibility) intermediate variables, we use the principal
stratification framework to define causal estimands within the Rubin Causal
Model. We propose a probabilistic formulation of the assignment mechanism
underlying RD designs, by re-formulating the Stable Unit Treatment Value
Assumption (SUTVA) and making an explicit local overlap assumption for
a subpopulation around the threshold. A local randomization assumption is
invoked instead of more standard continuity assumptions. We also develop
a model-based Bayesian approach to select the target subpopulation(s) with
adjustment for multiple comparisons, and to draw inference for the target
causal estimands in this framework. Applying the method to the data from
two Italian universities, we find evidence that university grants are effective
in preventing students from low-income families from dropping out of higher
education.
1. Introduction. Amid the recent economic crisis in Europe, there has been a heated
debate on how to arrange college students financial support, especially in terms of the in-
struments used, e.g., loans, grants, tuition waiver. Accurate evaluation of the effectiveness
of the existing financial aid systems is crucial for providing information to policy makers
to choose between different instruments. In Italy state universities offer financial aid every
year to a limited number of eligible freshmen. The main objective of this intervention is
to give equal opportunity to achieve higher education to motivated students irrespective of
their economic background. Dropout from university is a relevant phenomenon in Italy:
indeed, the low rate of university graduates among Italian youths is mainly due to the high
dropout rate (about 30%) rather than to a low enrollment rate. In this paper, we will investi-
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gate the causal effects of Italian university grants on preventing students from low-income
families from dropping out of higher education, using data on first-year enrollees from two
state universities.
In the Italian university system, only students who both meet a pre-fixed eligibility
criteria and apply for a grant can receive the grant, consisting of tuition waiver, free
meals and accommodation, and a limited amount of money around 3 000 Euros. The
eligibility status depends on an economic measurement of the student’s family income
and assets falling below or above a pre-determined threshold. This allocation rule mo-
tivates us to adopt the regression discontinuity (RD) design framework for evaluation.
RD design—a quasi-experimental design for causal inference—was first introduced in
psychology by Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960) and has became increasingly popular
since the late 1990s in economics and other fields. Recent surveys can be found in Cook
(2008); Imbens and Lemieux (2008); van der Klaauw (2008); Lee and Lemieux (2010).
There are two general setups in RD designs, the sharp and the fuzzy RD designs. In the
sharp RD design, the original form of the design, the treatment status is assumed to be a de-
terministic step function of a so-called forcing variable or running variable. All units with
a realized value of the forcing variable on one side of a pre-fixed threshold are assigned to
one regime and all units on the other side are assigned to the other regime. The basic idea
underlying a RD analysis is that one can compare units with very similar values for the
forcing variable, but different levels of treatment, to draw inference on the causal effect of
the treatment at the threshold. Examples of sharp RD designs can be found, among others,
in Berk and de Leuuw (1999); Lee (2008); Mealli and Rampichini (2012). In the fuzzy RD
design, the realized value of the forcing variable does not alone determine the receipt of
the treatment, although a value of the forcing variable falling above or below the threshold
acts as an encouragement or incentive to participate in the treatment. In those cases, the re-
ceipt of the treatment depends also on individual choices, which may confound treatment
receipt. Hahn, Todd and Van der Klaauw (2001) establish a connection between fuzzy RD
designs and the instrumental variable (IV) settings, and show that in a fuzzy RD setting one
can identify the local average treatment effect (Imbens and Angrist, 1994) for a subpopu-
lation of compliers at the threshold. Examples of fuzzy RD designs can be found, among
others, in van der Klaauw (2002); Battistin and Rettore (2008); Garibaldi et al. (2012).
The Italian university grant allocation rule defines a fuzzy RD design because not all
eligible students get a grant, they must apply first, and application is voluntary. Also inel-
igible students may apply, even if they will not receive any grant. Comparing to standard
fuzzy RD designs where only assignment (eligibility) and receipt of the treatment (grant)
are available, the additional data on the application status in this study can provide valu-
able information with important policy implications. In this article, we will show how to
capitalize on application. In particular, a main methodological contribution of this article
is to develop a framework for RD analysis that is fully consistent with the Rubin Causal
Model (RCM, Rubin, 1974, 1978) using potential outcomes. Resting on the fact that grant
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application and grant receipt statuses are post-assignment (post-eligibility) intermediate
variables, we adopt the principal stratification framework (Frangakis and Rubin, 2002)—a
generalization of the IV approach to noncompliance (Angrist, Imbens and Rubin, 1996;
Imbens and Rubin, 1997)—to define causal estimands and lay the basis for inference.
In the literature, causal inference in RD designs is usually based on comparisons of units
with close but distinct values of the forcing variable and relies on smoothness assumptions
about the relationship between outcomes and the forcing variable around the threshold,
which imply randomization at the single threshold value. For example, in fuzzy RDs, esti-
mands are usually specified as ratio of differences of regression functions at the threshold,
and inference generally relies on asymptotic approximations (e.g. Imbens and Lemieux,
2008). In real applications, large-sample approximations might be unreliable due to the
small sample size, and exact inference would be preferable. RD designs have been of-
ten described as designs that lead to locally randomized experiments around the thresh-
old (Lee, 2008; Lee and Lemieux, 2010; Dinardo and Lee, 2011). Expanding on this in-
terpretation, a recent strand of the literature (e.g., Cattaneo, Frandsen and Titiunik, 2015;
Sales and Hansen, 2014) is moving towards a formal and well-structured definition of the
conditions under which RD designs are equivalent to local randomized experiments.
We further develop the idea of local randomization; our goal is to provide a formal def-
inition of the hypothetical experiment underlying RD designs, based on a description of
the assignment mechanism, i.e., the process that describes why some units got assigned
to different treatments, formalized as a unit-exchangeable stochastic function of covari-
ates and potential outcomes. The core of our framework is to assume there exists at least
one subpopulation around the threshold where a local overlap assumption holds. For this
subpopulation we explicitly introduce a local randomization assumption.
Though our framework is not tied to any mode of inference, we choose the Bayesian
approach for reasons explained later. In particular, a second methodological contribu-
tion of this article lies in our development of a Bayesian hierarchical modeling approach
to adjust for multiple comparisons in selecting the target subpopulation(s). Our work
contributes to the limited literature on Bayesian analysis to RD (Chib and Jacobi, 2011;
Chib and Greenberg, 2014), as well as to the literature on Bayesian causal inference (e.g.,
Rubin, 1978; Imbens and Rubin, 1997; Barnard et al., 2003; Elliott, Raghunathan and Li,
2010; Schwartz, Li and Mealli, 2011; Mattei, Li and Mealli, 2013).
In Section 2, we introduce the basic setup and the causal estimands. In Section 3, we
propose a probabilistic formulation of the assignment mechanism for general RD designs,
explicitly formulating the key assumptions, and elaborate it for the particular RD design
used in the Italian university grants. Selection of the subpopulations where these assump-
tions hold is also discussed. A Bayesian approach for inferring causal effects in RD designs
is developed in Section 4. We then apply the proposed approach to evaluate causal effects
of Italian university grants on student dropout in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
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2. Causal estimands.
2.1. Basic setup. We introduce the notation in the context of Italian university grants.
Let Z be the eligibility status, which is the initial assignment and plays the role of an
“instrument” or an “encouragement” as in randomized experiments with noncompliance.
Consider a sample or population of N units; each can be either eligible to receive a treat-
ment, z = 1, or ineligible, z = 0. In the Italian grants system, eligibility depends on the
value of a combined measurement of one’s assets including income and properties, ad-
justed for family size, denoted by S . If a student, satisfying preliminary grade criteria, has
a value of S falling below a pre-determined threshold, e.g. s0 = 15 000 euro, he/she is
eligible, and not otherwise. That is, the eligibility status Zi for student i is a deterministic
function of S : Zi = 1(S i ≤ s0), where 1(·) is the indicator function. Using the terminology
in RD designs, S is the forcing variable.
All variables measured after each unit i is assigned eligibility Zi, namely, the application
status, the receipt of the grant and the dropout status, are post-assignment variables, and,
in principle, eligibility may affect them. Thus we can define potential outcomes for these
variables: for each student i (i = 1, . . . , N), given eligibility status z (z = 0, 1), let Ai(z)
be an indicator for the potential grant application status (equal to 1 if student i applies for
a grant and 0 otherwise), Wi(z) be an indicator for the potential treatment received (equal
to 1 if student i receives a grant and 0 otherwise), and Yi(z) be the potential indicator for
dropout (1 if student i drops out of university, 0 otherwise). These notations, with only two
potential outcomes for each post-treatment variable for each unit, reflect the acceptance of
the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA, Rubin, 1980), which implies that
there is no interference between units and that there are no levels of the eligibility status
other than zero and one. A more explicit formulation of SUTVA will be introduced in
Section 3.1.
For each unit, i, given the observed eligibility status Zi, the following variables are
observed: Aobsi = Ai(Zi), the observed application status; Wobsi = Wi(Zi), the observed
treatment received; and Yobsi = Yi(Zi), the observed dropout status. The remaining potential
outcomes are missing: Amisi = Ai(1−Zi), Wmisi = Wi(1−Zi), and Ymisi = Yi(1−Zi). A vector
of p pre-treatment variables, Xi, is also observed for each unit. We use boldface upper-case
letters to denote the vector of values of a variable for all units from hereon. For example,
Z = (Z1, . . . , ZN)′, Aobs = (Aobs1 , . . . , AobsN )′.
2.2. The role of Principal Stratification for causal inference in Fuzzy RD designs. In
the RCM, a causal effect is defined as a comparison of the potential outcomes Yi(1) and
Yi(0), e.g., E[Yi(1) − Yi(0)], for a common set of units. Obviously, in our study, such
comparisons between potential dropout statuses only measure the effect of the eligibility
status. To draw inference about the causal effect of receiving a grant, additional struc-
ture and assumptions are required. Since both the application status and receipt of the
grant are post-assignment intermediate variables, we adopt the Principal Stratification
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(Frangakis and Rubin, 2002) framework.
For each intermediate variable, principal stratification defines a cross-classification of
subjects into groups, named principal strata, defined by the joint potential values of that
intermediate variable under each of the assignments being compared. In our study, based
on the application status A, subjects are classified into four (latent) principal strata, Gi ≡
(Ai(0), Ai(1)): compliant-applicants Gi = (0, 1) = CA, students who would not apply if
ineligible, but would apply if eligible; always-applicants Gi = (1, 1) = AA, students who
would apply irrespective of their eligibility status; never-applicants Gi = (0, 0) = NA,
students who would not apply irrespective of their eligibility status; and defiant-applicants
Gi = (1, 0) = DA, students who would not apply if eligible, but would apply if ineligible.
Because principal strata are not affected by assignment, we can define population-average
causal effects conditional on the principal strata, known as principal causal effects:
τg ≡ E[Yi(1) − Yi(0)|Gi = g],(1)
for g = AA,CA, NA, DA. Then the average causal effect of eligibility on dropout is a
weighted average of these principal causal effects:
E[Yi(1) − Yi(0)] =
∑
g=AA,CA,NA,DA
πgτg,
where πg is the proportion of units in principal stratum g.
Never-applicants and defiant-applicants never receive a grant, so for them we always
observe the outcome in the absence of the grant. By contrast, for always-applicants and
compliant-applicants we can observe Yi(1) for some eligible students who receive a grant
and Yi(0) for some other ineligible students who do not receive a grant. Therefore, always-
applicants and compliant-applicants are the only groups where we can learn information
about the effect of receiving a grant in this study, and thus the corresponding principal
causal effects, τAA and τCA, are the causal estimands of primary interest.
In the standard IV approach to noncompliance (Angrist, Imbens and Rubin, 1996; Imbens and Rubin,
1997) as well as standard setting of fuzzy RD designs (e.g., Imbens and Lemieux, 2008),
data on application status is not utilized, either because it is not available or because it
is ignored. Instead, the analysis is based on the principal strata formed by the interme-
diate variable of grant receipt status. Specifically, there are four principal strata based on
the joint potential grant receipt statuses, Ri = (Wi(0),Wi(1)): compliers Ri = (0, 1), stu-
dents who would receive the grant if eligible and would not receive the grant if ineligible;
always-takers Ri = (1, 1), student would receive the grant regardless of eligibility; never-
takers Ri = (0, 0), student would not receive the grant regardless of eligibility; and defiers
Ri = (1, 0), students who would not receive the grant if eligible and would receive the
grant if ineligible. The focus is generally on the causal effect for compliers:
τ ≡ E[Yi(1) − Yi(0) | Ri = (0, 1)].
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We now establish the connection between these two sets of principal strata. The Italian
grant assignment rule implies that Wi(0) = 0 for all i, as ineligible units have no access to
a grant, and Wi(1) = 0 if Ai(1) = 0, as eligible units need to apply for a grant to receive
a grant. Therefore, by design, there are no always-takers or defiers, and the remaining
principal strata R’s can be expressed as unions of principal strata G’s: never-takers com-
prise never-applicants and defiant-applicants, and compliers comprise always-applicants
and compliant-applicants. As such, τ can be rewritten as the weighted average of the causal
effects for always-applicants and compliant-applicants:
τ = E[Yi(1) − Yi(0) | Gi ∈ {AA,CA}] = πAAτAA + πCAτCA
πAA + πCA
.(2)
This illustrates that principal strata defined by the application status leads to a finer parti-
tion of the units than principal strata defined by the grant-receipt status. Indeed the stan-
dard IV causal estimand—the causal effect for compliers τ —provides information on a
‘marginal’ (with respect to application behavior) causal effect. If causal effects are homo-
geneous, marginalizing over application behavior does not critically affect the evaluation
analysis. Conversely, if causal effects are heterogeneous, as we have found in this study,
ignoring application behavior represents a loss of useful information with potentially im-
portant policy implications. For example, if the grants are found out to have a higher posi-
tive effect on always-applicants than on compliant-applicants, then it would be useful and
cost-effective to study the characteristics of ineligible applicants and include those into the
eligibility rule to allocate additional resources.
The estimands τAA, τCA and τ represent effects of eligibility, rather than effects of the
receipt of a grant. However, “the receipt of a grant” is completely confounded with “the
eligibility status”: W(z) = z × A(z) = z for always-applicants and compliant-applicants.
To attribute these effects to “the receipt of a grant”, below we can make an exclusion
restriction assumption:
Assumption 1. (Exclusion Restriction for Compliant-Applicants and Always-Applicants).
For all units with Gi ∈ {AA,CA}, or equivalently Ri = (0, 1), the effect of eligibility is only
through the receipt of the grant.
Assumption 1 attributes the intention-to-treat effect for compliers to the causal effect of
the receipt of grant, rather than to its assignment (eligibility). A more formal version of
this assumption, which requires double-indexed notations, is given in Imbens and Rubin
(2015) (Chapter 23, Assumption 23.4). This type of exclusion restriction is routinely made,
often implicitly, in randomized experiments with full compliance (Mealli and Rubin, 2002;
Mealli and Pacini, 2013; Imbens and Rubin, 2015).
In real studies, the sample-average counterpart of the population-average estimands
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may also be of interest:
(3) τSg ≡
1
Ng
∑
i:Gi=g
[Yi(1) − Yi(0)],
where g = AA,CA, {AA,CA} and Ng is the number of units in stratum g. Usually the
sample-average effects can be estimated more precisely than their population-average
counterparts. The subtle difference between them in Bayesian inference is explained in
Section 4. More details can be found, for example, in Rubin (1978); Imbens and Rubin
(1997) and Imbens (2004). For simplicity of notation, we do not make the distinction
between population-average and sample-average estimands in the methodological discus-
sion, but will present both estimates in the application.
3. The basis for inference.
3.1. Probabilistic treatment assignment mechanism in RD designs. The complex se-
lection process in Italian university grants system implies that the mechanism governing
the receipt of the grant, which depends on both institutional and individual choices, is
not ignorable. Below we introduce a probabilistic assignment mechanism underlying the
RD design considered here, which is also applicable to general RD settings with minor
modifications.
We first define the assignment mechanism, which is a row-exchangeable function that
assigns probabilities to all 2N possible N−dimensional vectors of assignments Z, as a row-
exchangeable function that assigns probabilities to all possible N−dimensional vectors of
realizations of the forcing variable, S, above or below the threshold value, s0. Formally,
Pr (Z = z|A(0),A(1),W(0),W(1),Y(0),Y(1),X)(4)
= Pr (S ∈ Λ|A(0),A(1),W(0),W(1),Y(0),Y(1),X) ,
where z ∈ {0, 1}N and Λ ∈
{
(−∞, s0]N , (−∞, s0]N−1 × (s0,∞), (s0,∞) × (−∞, s0]N−1, . . . ,
(−∞, s0]× (s0,∞)N−1, (−∞, s0]N−1 × (s0,∞), (s0,∞)N
}
. Since Z is a deterministic function
of S , the assignment mechanism can be formulated with respect to either Z or S . Here we
prefer S because it is the underlying random variable that describes the reasons for the
missing and observed values of potential outcomes: a value of S is assigned, which in turn
determines a value for Z.
Statistical inference for causal effects requires assumptions on the assignment mecha-
nism. We introduce assumptions that allow us to describe RD settings as classical random-
ized experiments around the threshold. The assignment mechanism in Equation (4) is a
classical randomized experiment if (i) it is individualistic:
Pr (S ∈ Λ|A(0),A(1),W(0),W(1),Y(0),Y(1),X)
=
n∏
i=1
Pr (S i ≤ s0|Ai(0), Ai(1),Wi(0),Wi(1), Yi(0), Yi(1),Xi) ;
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(ii) it is probabilistic, which implies that for each unit, i, both events S i ≤ s0 and S i > s0
have a priori a non-zero probability of occurring; (iii) it is unconfounded, that is, free of
dependence of any potential outcomes; and (iv) it is a known function of its arguments.
The particular assignment rules underlying RD designs suggest that these assumptions
are more reasonable for subpopulations of units who have a relatively large probability
that the realized values of the forcing variable fall in a neighborhood around the threshold,
s0. For these subpopulations, we can reasonably assume that the distribution of the forcing
variable is unrelated to observed and unobserved characteristics of students. On the other
hand students with a very small (close to zero) or a very large (close to one) probability
that S i ≤ s0 are likely systematically different from other students. For example, poten-
tial outcomes observed for very rich students, who do not receive any grant, are plausibly
different from potential outcomes for poor students with a realized value of S around the
threshold, who do not receive a grant, and vice versa. Therefore we focus on subpopula-
tions of students who have a probability that S i ≤ s0 strictly between zero and one, and
sufficiently far away from zero and one. The following assumption guarantees that at least
one such subpopulation of units exists.
Assumption 2. (Local overlap). Let U be the random sample (or population) of units
in the study. There exists a subset of units, Us0 , such that for each i ∈ Us0 , Pr(S i ≤ s0) > ǫ
and Pr(S i > s0) > ǫ for some sufficiently large ǫ > 0.
Assumption 2 assumes that there exists a subpopulation of units, each of whom has a
non-zero probability of being assigned to either treatment levels. This represents a main
distinction between our framework and the existing RD literature that often describes RD
designs as settings where the overlap assumption is violated. Now within the subpopula-
tion Us0 we can formally introduce a modified SUTVA specific to the RD settings:
Assumption 3. (Local RD-SUTVA). For each i ∈ Us0 , consider two eligibility statuses
Z ′i = 1(S ′i ≤ s0) and Z
′′
i = 1(S
′′
i ≤ s0), with possibly S
′
i , S
′′
i . If Z
′
i = Z
′′
i , that is, if either
S ′i ≤ s0 and S
′′
i ≤ s0, or S
′
i > s0 and S
′′
i > s0, then Ai(Z
′) = Ai(Z′′), Wi(Z′) = Wi(Z′′),
and Yi(Z′) = Yi(Z′′).
Local RD-SUTVA rules out interference between units, implying that potential out-
comes for a student cannot be affected by the eligibility status of other students. Local
RD-SUTVA also assumes that there are no levels of the eligibility status other than zero
and one. This component of RD-SUTVA implies that values of the forcing variable lead-
ing to the same eligibility status cannot alter potential outcomes for any unit, and thus
allows us to avoid defining potential outcomes as functions of the forcing variable. Under
the local RD-SUTVA for each unit within Us0 there exist only two potential outcomes for
each post-assignment variable, corresponding to the realized value of the forcing variable
falling below and above the threshold, respectively.
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Finally, we need to formalize the concept of RD design as local randomized experiment:
in a neighborhood of the threshold s0 the forcing variable does not depend on either the
potential outcomes or pre-treatment variables. Formally, we have:
Assumption 4. (Local randomization). For each i ∈ Us0 ,
Pr (S i|Ai(0), Ai(1),Wi(0),Wi(1), Yi(0), Yi(1),Xi) = Pr (S i) .
Assumption 4 states that within the subpopulation Us0 a Bernoulli trial has been con-
ducted, with individual assignment probabilities, that is, the individual probabilities of
being eligible to receive a grant, depending only on the distribution of the forcing variable:
Pr(Zi = 1) = Pr(S i ≤ s0). This assumption is crucial in justifying the key idea underlying
any RD design. It implies that the eligibility statuses are randomly assigned in some small
neighborhood, Us0 , around s0.
Assumption 4 may not always be plausible. For instance, when the forcing variable
is a deterministic variable, which conceptually cannot be interpreted as a random vari-
able with a non-degenerate probability distribution (such as time), the underlying design
cannot, in general, be interpreted as a local randomized experiment (see Section 6.3 in
Lee and Lemieux, 2010, pp 347).
There are subtle but substantive differences between local RD-SUTVA and local ran-
domization. Local RD-SUTVA is an exclusion restriction assumption and it is required to
make the representation of potential outcomes as functions of the eligibility status ade-
quate. Local randomization is an independence assumption and it is crucial to make infer-
ence. RD-SUTVA is different from independence assumptions: it does not imply that the
probability that we observe a value of the forcing variable above or below the threshold
does not depend on potential outcomes. RD-SUTVA simply implies that the exposure to
assignment level z specifies well-defined potential outcomes, for all unit i and assignment
levels z. In other words, considering potential outcomes as random variables, RD-SUTVA
does not imply that potential outcomes have the same distribution for each value of the
forcing variable. In order to make the forcing variable independent of potential outcomes,
we need to introduce additional assumptions, such as Assumption 4.
Following Assumption 2, we can define a local version of the target estimands:
(5) τg,s0 ≡ E
[
Yi(1) − Yi(0) | Gi = g, i ∈ Us0
]
,
for g = AA,CA, {AA,CA} and their finite-sample counterparts, and we have:
τ{AA,CA},s0 ≡ τs0 =
τAA,s0πAA,s0 + τCA,s0πCA,s0
πAA,s0 + πCA,s0
,
where πg,s0 = Pr(Gi = g|i ∈ Us0) for g = AA,CA, NA, DA, denote the proportion of
principal strata in the subpopulation Us0 . A special case of Us0 contains the subpopulation
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of units with a realized value of the forcing variable exactly equal to the threshold value,
s0.
It is worth noting that Assumption 4 implies that
E
[
Yi(1) − Yi(0) | Gi = g, i ∈ Us0
]
= E
[
Yi(1) − Yi(0) | Zi = 1,Gi = g, i ∈ Us0
]
.
Under the allocation rule of the Italian university grants, Zi = Wobsi for always-applicants
and compliant-applicants. Therefore, the local randomization assumption allows the es-
timands τAA,s0 , τCA,s0 , and τs0 to be interpreted as causal effects of receiving a grant for
subpopulations of students who actually receive a grant, analogous to the notion of average
treatment effect for the treated.
3.2. Two additional assumptions. The following two assumptions—though not nec-
essary for Bayesian inference—are plausible in our study and can sharpen the inference.
Assumption 5. Monotonicity of Application Status:
Ai(1) ≥ Ai(0), for all i ∈ Us0 .
Assumption 6. Stochastic Exclusion Restriction for Never-Applicants:
Pr(Yi(1)|Gi = NA, i ∈ Us0) = Pr(Yi(0)|Gi = NA, i ∈ Us0).
Monotonicity rules out the existence of defiant-applicants. The exclusion restriction
rules out direct effects of eligibility on dropout for never-applicants. Never-applicants are
students who would never apply for a grant irrespective of their eligibility status. These
students would not receive the grant in any case. Exclusion restriction for never-applicants
(Assumption 6) is of very different nature from the exclusion restriction for compliant-
applicants and always-applicants (Assumption 1): Assumption 6 has implications for in-
ference but not for interpretation, whereas Assumption 1 is made solely for interpreting the
causal effects of assignment on the outcome attributable to the causal effects of treatment
on the outcome. More discussions on the difference can be found in Imbens and Rubin
(2015, Chapter 23) and Mealli and Pacini (2013).
3.3. Selection of the subpopulations. An important issue in practice is the selection of
the subpopulation Us0 where the RD assumptions hold. There can be a diverse choice of
the shape of the subpopulation. In this paper, we limit our choice to symmetric intervals
with respect to s0, for convenience and also to match the common practice of RD analysis.
Specifically, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 7. There exists h > 0 such that for each ǫ > 0, Pr(s0 − h ≤ S i ≤ s0 + h) >
1 − ǫ, for each i ∈ Us0 .
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Assumption 7 allows us to focus on the specific subsets of symmetric intervals among
all neighborhoods of different shape around the threshold, s0. Note that Assumptions 2
and 7 do not imply that Us0 is unique. They only require that there exists at least one
subpopulation, Us0 . Consequently, we are not interested in finding the largest h, but we
only aim at determining plausible values for h.
Our approach for selecting bandwidth h exploits the fact that Assumption 4 is a local
randomization assumption, in the sense that it holds for a subset of units, but may not
hold in general for other units. As such, under Assumption 4, in the subpopulation Us0 ,
pre-treatment variables should be well balanced in the two subsamples defined by assign-
ment, and thus any test of the null hypothesis of no effect of assignment on pre-treatment
covariates should fail to reject the null.
Assessing balance in the observed covariates raises problems of multiple comparisons,
which may lead to a much higher than planned type I error if they are ignored (e.g.,
Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995). We account for multiplicities using a Bayesian hierarchi-
cal mixed model, which provides an explicit method for borrowing information across co-
variates (e.g., Berry and Berry, 2004; Scott and Berger, 2006). Following Berry and Berry
(2004), we use a mixture for the prior distribution of the eligibility parameters by assign-
ing a point mass on equality of the means of the covariates between eligible and ineligible
units. This Bayesian procedure provides a measure of the risk (posterior probability) that a
chosen interval around the threshold, s0, defines a subpopulation of units that does not ex-
actly matches any true Us0 , including subjects for which our RD assumptions do not hold.
More details are given in Section 5. The idea to exploit balance tests of pre-assignment
variables to select a subpopulation of units is also used in Cattaneo, Frandsen and Titiunik
(2015), but their approach aims at selecting the largest subpopulation and does not account
for multiple comparisons.
Our approach parallels more conventional RD approaches based on local polynomial re-
gression, which also involve bandwidth selection, but for a very different objective, namely
finding an optimal balance between precision and bias at the threshold for local polynomi-
als (e.g., Ludwig and Miller, 2007; Lee and Lemieux, 2010; Imbens and Kalyanaraman,
2012), whereas the objective in our framework is to find a subpopulation where our RD
assumptions are plausible and the selected subpopulation defines the target population.
3.4. Mode of inference. Once the subpopulation Us0 is chosen, and under the RD as-
sumptions 2-4, one can choose different modes of inference for the target causal estimands,
as in the large literature of principal stratification. For example, under the additional As-
sumptions 5 and 6, the average causal effect for compliers, τs0 , is non-parametrically point
identified and could be estimated using standard moment-based (instrumental variable)
methods. But the average causal effects for always-applicants and compliant-applicants,
τAA,s0 and τCA,s0 can be only non-parametrically partially identified (Mealli and Pacini,
2013). One can also use likelihood approaches to parametrically estimate causal effects
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(e.g., Frumento et al., 2012; Mercatanti, 2013). Randomization-based inference (Fisher,
1925), as in Cattaneo, Frandsen and Titiunik (2015), could also be adopted.
In this article, we choose the Bayesian approach for inference for the following reasons.
First, causal inference in RD designs usually involves complex observational data, with
multiple sources of uncertainties, including the missing potential outcomes; the Bayesian
approach is particularly useful for accounting for uncertainties and for pooling information
from the data in such complex settings. Second, RD analysis usually relies on a sample
of units with values of the forcing variable close to a single point, the size of which may
be small; Bayesian methods, not relying on asymptotic approximations, are attractive in
dealing with small samples. Third, in the Bayesian paradigm, the missing potential out-
comes are treated as random variables, and all inferences are based on the posterior dis-
tributions of causal estimands, which are functions of potential outcomes. Thus inference
about finite-sample and super-population estimands can be drawn using the same inferen-
tial procedures. Finally, pre-treatment variables can be easily incorporated in the Bayesian
approach, which may improve efficiency of the analysis, i.e., reduce posterior variability.
4. Bayesian inference. Our development of the Bayesian approach builds on the sem-
inal works of Rubin (1978) and Imbens and Rubin (1997). Below we give a brief outline
for conduction principal stratification analysis using a Bayesian approach; the readers may
refer to the existing literature for more details (e.g., Elliott, Raghunathan and Li, 2010;
Schwartz, Li and Mealli, 2011; Mattei, Li and Mealli, 2013). Throughout the discussion,
we use p(·|·) and θ·|· to denote generic conditional distributions and the corresponding pa-
rameters, respectively.
Nine quantities are associated with each unit: Yi(0), Yi(1), Wi(0), Wi(1), Ai(0), Ai(1), Xi,
Zi, S i. Among these, S i completely determines Zi; the principal stratum Gi = (Ai(0), Ai(1))
and S i completely determine (Wi(0),Wi(1)). Therefore, inference for causal effects in-
volves only Yi(0), Yi(1), Ai(0), Ai(1), Xi, S i, of which four are observed: S i, Xi, Aobsi =
Ai(Zi), Yobsi = Yi(Zi), and two are unobserved: Amisi = Ai(1 − Zi), Ymisi = Yi(1 − Zi).
Bayesian inference considers the observed values to be realizations of random variables
and the unobserved values to be unobserved random variables. Let p(Y(0),Y(1),A(0),A(1),
X, S;Us0) denote the joint probability density function of these random variables for all
units in Us0 . We assume this distribution is unit-exchangeable, that is, it is invariant under
a permutation of the unit indices. Then, with essentially no loss of generality, by appealing
to de Finetti’s theorem (de Finetti, 1963), we can assume that there exists an unknown pa-
rameter vector θ, which is itself a random variable having a known prior distribution p(θ)
such that:
p
(
Y(0),Y(1),A(0),A(1),X, S;Us0
)
=
∫ ∏
i∈Us0
p (Yi(0), Yi(1), Ai(0), Ai(1),Xi, S i|θ) p(θ)d θ.
Bayesian inference of the causal estimands, which are functions of Yi(z)’s and Ai(z)’s,
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centers around deriving the posterior distribution for the parameter vector of their distri-
bution, denoted by θY,G. Under Assumption 4, and assuming the parameters governing the
distributions of the covariates, the forcing variable, and the potential outcomes are a priori
distinct and independent, the posterior distribution of θY,G can be written as follows:
p
(
θY,G |Yobs,Aobs,X, S;Us0
)
∝ p(θY |G) × p(θG)×(6) ∏
i∈Us0
[ ∫ ∫
p
(
Yi(0), Yi(1)|Gi,Xi; θY |G) p (Gi|Xi; θG) d Ymisi d Amisi
]
.
The above decomposition suggests that two models need to be specified for model-based
inference: (1) the model for potential outcomes conditional on principal strata and covari-
ates, and (2) the model for principal strata conditional on covariates, as well as the prior
distribution for the parameters, p(θY,G), with θY,G = (θG, θY |G).
Let πi,g = Pr(Gi = g|Xi; θG) and fi,gz = p(Yi(z)|Gi = g,Xi; θY |G). Then the posterior
distribution of θY,G given the observed data can be written as follows:
p
(
θY,G|Yobs,Aobs,X, S;Us0
)
(7)
∝ p(θY,G) ×
∏
i∈Us0 :S i>s0,A
obs
i =0
(
πi,CA fi,CA,0 + πi,NA fi,NA) ×
∏
i∈Us0 :S i>s0,A
obs
i =1
πi,AA fi,AA,0
×
∏
i∈Us0 :S i≤s0 ,A
obs
i =0
πi,NA fi,NA ×
∏
i∈Us0 :S i≤s0 ,A
obs
i =1
(
πi,AA fi,AA,1 + πi,CA fi,CA,1) ,
where fi,NA = fi,NA,0 = fi,NA,1 by the exclusion restriction (Assumption 6). The likeli-
hood function, specified by the four products, does not depend on the association between
the potential outcomes Yi(0) and Yi(1). Therefore the posterior distribution of the associ-
ation parameters equal their prior distribution as long as the association parameters are
a priori independent of the other parameters, as we assume henceforth. The population-
average causal estimands τAA,s0 , τCA,s0 , and τs0 are functions of the parameter vector θY,G,
which is free of the association parameters, therefore inference for them does not involve
the association parameters (also see discussion in Imbens and Rubin, 1997). Inference for
sample-average causal estimands for the units in the study, on the other hand, do generally
involve the association parameters. In our application inference for sample-average causal
estimands is drawn under the assumption that for each unit i, potential outcomes, Yi(0) and
Yi(1), are independent conditional on Xi and θ.
Posterior inference of θY,G can be obtained using Gibbs sampling with a data augmenta-
tion step to impute the missing Amisi , iteratively drawing from the two posterior predictive
distributions, p
(
θY,G|Yobs,Aobs,Amis,X, S;Us0
)
and p
(
Amis|Yobs,Aobs,X, S, θY,S ;Us0
)
.
Specification of πi,g, fi,gz and corresponding prior to posterior computation depends on
the specific application. Details of the models and computation in our application will be
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provided in Section 5. As a general guideline, we recommend to specify πi,g and fi,gz con-
ditional on both covariates X and the forcing variable S , even though Equation (6) suggests
conditioning on S is not required. Indeed, if the true subpopulations Us0 were known, in
theory, we would not need to adjust for S , because local randomization guarantees that for
units in Us0 values of the forcing variable falling above or below the threshold are inde-
pendent of the potential outcomes. However, in practice, the true subpopulations Us0 are
usually unknown and once a subpopulation has been selected, that is, once a value for h,
say h∗, has been chosen, there may be some units with a realized value of S between s0−h∗
and s0 + h∗ who do not belong to Us0 . For these units there may be a relationship between
the forcing variable and potential outcomes, and these potential dependences need to be
modeled. Specifically, systematic differences in the forcing variable S that, by definition,
occur between eligible and ineligible units, may affect inference in the presence of students
who do not belong to Us0 .
5. Evaluation of Italian university grants.
5.1. Data. We apply the proposed method to the data from the cohort of first-year stu-
dents enrolled in 2004 to 2006 at University of Pisa and University of Florence. For each
student, information on grant application status (Aobsi ), grant receipt status (Wobsi ) at the
beginning of the academic year, dropout status at the end of the academic year, and covari-
ates (Xi) is obtained from ministry of education and university administrative records. The
forcing variable S is a combined economic measure of each student, calculated from one’s
income tax return and property adjusted for family size based on a formula that is typically
not fully known to the students. In all three years, the threshold of eligibility is the com-
bined economic measure of a student below 15 000 euros. Thus, the eligibility status (Z) is
also observed. Typically, students need support from fiscal experts to compute their value
of S , and the income revenue authority conducts random inspections to verify that the of-
ficial tax return were reported. These factors make extremely difficult, if not impossible,
for students or students’ families to manipulate the value of S in order to end up on the
right side of the threshold. Therefore we argue that the local randomization assumption is
reasonable here. Ineligible students apply either usually because they are not fully aware
of their eligibility status, or because they hope that their application will be still considered
because of extra funding or other considerations.
Covariates include sex, high school grade, high school type (4 categories), major in
university (6 categories), indicator of year of enrollment (2004, 2005, 2006) and indicator
of university (Pisa vs. Florence). Note that the data only include students who had a high
school grade of at least 70/100 and applied either for a grant or for a reduction of tuition
fee. Summary statistics of important variables for the students with the combined eco-
nomic measure S within 1000 euros of the threshold are given in Table 1. An unadjusted
comparison would suggest that the applicants have higher high-school grades, which is
an important indicator of a student’s academic performance, but also higher dropout rate
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regardless of their eligibility status.
Application rate and dropout rate as a function of S among the students are given in
Figure 1. The overall dropout rate is high, consistently between 30% to 50% regardless of
the economic measure. From the fitted lines using local logistic polynomial models with
order 3 on the two sides of the threshold, discontinuity is clearly visible in both application
rate and dropout rate at the threshold. As the economic measure increases, application rate
steadily decreases, while the trend in dropout rate has a concave change at the threshold,
increasing on the left of the threshold and decreasing on the right.
Table 1
Summary statistics of the first-year students enrolled in 2004 − 2006 at Universities of Pisa and Florence, for
the students with S i ∈ (14 000, 16 000) euros (i.e., h = 1 000, s0 = 15 000).
Z = 0 Z = 1
Variable Aobs = 0 Aobs = 1 Aobs = 0 Aobs = 1
Sample Size 657 304 703 444
Dropout 0.36 0.50 0.35 0.36
S (euros) 15 495 15 509 14 504 14 499
Female 0.59 0.61 0.60 0.55
HS Grade 80.80 84.35 80.17 84.47
University (Pisa) 0.37 0.51 0.37 0.51
5.2. Selection of the subpopulation. We apply the Bayesian approach to multiple test-
ing discussed in Section 3.3 to find subpopulations of units where our RD assumptions
hold. Specifically we use a hierarchical Bayesian model for assessing the balance of the
covariates between eligibility groups. We specify probit models for binary variables; con-
ditional probit models for categorical variables and Gaussian models for continuous vari-
ables. Formally, we assume that X j ∼ N(γ0 j + γ1 jZi, σ2j) if X j is continuous, and Pr(Xi j =
1) = Pr(X∗i j > 0) with X∗i j ∼ N
(
γ0 j + γ1 jZi, 1
)
, if X j is binary. If X j is a categorical vari-
able taking on K values we assume that Pr(Xi j = 1) = Pr
(
X∗(1)i j ≤ 0
)
, and Pr(Xi j = k) =
Pr
(
∩k−1
ℓ=1{X
∗(ℓ)
i j > 0} ∩ X
∗(k)
i j ≤ 0
)
for k = 2, . . . , K − 1, where X∗(k)i j ∼ N
(
γ
(k)
0 j + γ
(k)
1 j Zi, 1
)
,
k = 1, . . . , K − 1, independently. Let γ0 j =
(
γ
(1)
0 j , . . . , γ
(K−1)
0 j
)′
and γ1 j =
(
γ
(1)
1 j , . . . , γ
(K−1)
1 j
)′
.
We specify the following prior distributions for the model parameters. The variances
of the continuous variables have an inverse-Gamma distribution: σ2j ∼ IG(a, b). The γ0’s
have Gaussian prior distributions: for continuous and binary variables, γ0 j ∼ N(µγ0 , σ2γ0),
and for categorical variables, γ0 j ∼ N(µγ0 uK−1, σ2γ0 IK−1) with uK−1 and IK−1 being the
K − 1-dimensional vector of ones and the identity matrix of order K − 1, respectively.
Further, for continuous and binary variables, parameters γ1 j are the difference between
means/proportions for eligible and ineligible units. If γ1 j = 0 then X j has the same distri-
bution for eligible and ineligible units. For a categorical variable taking on K values, the
proportion of units in each category is the same for eligible and ineligible units if and only
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Fig 1. Application rate (a) and dropout rate (b) as a function of the forcing variable for the first year students in
Universities of Florence and Pisa in 2004−2006. The smoothed lines are estimated using polynomial logistic
regression models (of order 3) on each side of the threshold separately; each point are calculated from the
units within a binwidth of 50 euros.
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(b) Dropout rate.  —— Non-Applicants, • —— Applicants
if γ(k)1 j = 0 for each k = 1, . . . , K − 1. We assign positive probability to these possibilities
using the following mixture prior distributions:
γ1 j ∼ πγ1δ0(γ1 j) + (1 − πγ1)N(µγ1 , σ2γ1)
and
γ1 j ∼
K−1∏
k=1
[
πγ1δ0(γ(k)1 j ) + (1 − πγ1 )N(µγ1 , σ2γ1)
]
,
where δ0(·) is the Dirac delta distribution.
For the hyperparameters, we assign the following prior distributions: µγ0 ∼ N(µγ0 , σ
2
γ0
);
σ2γ0 ∼ IG(aγ0 , bγ0 ); µγ1 ∼ N(µγ1 , σ
2
γ1
); σ2γ1 ∼ IG(aγ1 , bγ1 ); and πγ1 ∼ Beta(aπ, bπ).
We implement the Bayesian model for assessing the balance of covariates on the two
sides of the threshold for various subpopulations defined by different values of h. Details
on the Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) for the posterior computation are relegated to
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Web Supplementary Material. Table 2 shows the posterior probabilities that the covariates
have the same distribution between eligible and ineligible students for the subpopulations
defined by h = 250, 500, 750, 1 000, 1 500, 2 000, 2 500, 3 000, 4 000, 5 000. These values
show that the probability of the pre-assignment variables being well balanced is high for
subpopulations defined by values of h strictly lower than 1 500: the vast majority of these
probabilities are larger than or close to 0.8. Note that the probabilities are in general lower
among the covariates of “major in university”, suggesting these covariates may not be as
balanced as other covariates. Nonetheless, nearly all these probabilities are still higher 0.6
with a single lowest probability being 0.565 (Tech major in university). For larger subpop-
ulations some covariates, such as the “indicator of university,” are clearly unbalanced.
Given that the risk that a chosen interval around the threshold defines a subpopula-
tion that includes units not belonging to the target subpopulation, Us0 , is not zero, in
order to account for the presence of these units, we conduct the subsequent analyses
conditioning on both covariates and the realized values on the forcing variable. Also
we evaluate the robustness of our results conducting analyses using various values of h
(h = 500, 1 000, 1 500)
5.3. Parametric models. For the units within the selected subpopulation Us0 , we as-
sume parametric models for the outcome ( fgz) and principal strata (πg). Alternative mod-
els, such as Student-t models (Chib and Jacobi, 2011) and Bayesian nonparametric models
(Schwartz, Li and Mealli, 2011), can be considered. Note that although we are using para-
metric models, identification does not rely on parametric assumptions. The model for the
principal strata of application consists of two conditional probit models:
πi,AA = Pr(G∗i (AA) ≤ 0),
πi,NA = Pr(G∗i (AA) > 0 and G∗i (NA) ≤ 0),
πi,CA = 1 − πi,AA − πi,NA,
where
G∗i (AA) = αAA,0 + α(S )AAS ∗i +X′iα(X)AA + ǫAA,i, G∗i (NA) = αNA,0 + α(S )NAS ∗i +X′iα(X)NA + ǫNA,i,
with ǫAA,i ∼ N(0, 1), ǫNA,i ∼ N(0, 1) independently, and S ∗i = (S i − s0)/1000.
Dropout, the primary outcome in our application, is binary. Therefore, we assume the
following generalized linear outcome model with a probit link (Albert and Chib, 1993):
Pr(Yi(z) = 1|Gi = g, S i,Xi) = Φ
(
β0,g,z + β
(S )
g,z S ∗i + X
′
iβ
(X)
g,z
)
.
We impose prior equality of the slope coefficients in the outcome regressions: β(X)g,z ≡ β(X)
for g = AA,CA, NA and z = 0, 1.
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Define αg = [αg0, α(S )g ,α(X)g ]′, g = AA, NA, and βg,z = [β0,g,z, β(S )g,z ]′, g = AA,CA, NA;
z = 0, 1. By Assumption 6, βNA,0 = βNA,1. We assume that parameters are a priori inde-
pendent and use multivariate normal prior distributions:
αg ∼ N
(
µ
αg
;σ2
αg
I
)
, βg,z ∼ N
(
µ
βg,z
;σ2
βg,z
I
)
, β(X) ∼ N
(
µ
β
;σ2
β
I
)
where I is the identity matrix. We specify flat priors setting the hyper-parameters as fol-
lows: setting µ
αg
, µ
βg,z
, µ
β
to be null vectors; and setting large prior variances σ2
αg
= 10,
σ2
βg,z
= 10, σ2
β
= 10 for g = AA,CA, NA; z = 0, 1.
5.4. Posterior computation. Details of the MCMC algorithm for the posterior compu-
tation based on the outline in Section 4 are given in Web Supplementary Material. Upon
obtaining the posterior draws of the parameters, we calculate three estimates for each
causal estimand: population-average effect within Us0 and at s0, and sample-average ef-
fect within Us0 . The population-average effects within Us0 are calculated averaging the
model-based dropout proportions over the empirical distribution of the pre-assignment
variables and the forcing variable:
∑
i∈Us0
πi,gΦ
(
β0,g,1 + β
(S )
g,1S
∗
i + X
′
iβ
(X))
∑
i∈Us0
πi,g
−
∑
i∈Us0
πi,gΦ
(
β0,g,0 + β
(S )
g,0S
∗
i + X
′
iβ
(X))
∑
i∈Us0
πi,g
,
for g = AA,CA, {AA,CA}. The population-average effects at s0 are calculated in a similar
way setting S ∗i = 0 (i.e., S i = s0) for each i. To obtain the sample-average estimates, we
compute the posterior predictive distributions of the potential outcomes for each student i
in Us0 , based on which the sample average is calculated.
5.5. Results. We conducted Bayesian analysis using h = 500, 1 000, 1 500. Posterior
inference is based on 5 000 draws from the posterior distributions simulated using single
chains, which were run for 125 000 iterations. To assess convergence of iterative sim-
ulation methods, we calculated the Cramer-von-Mises statistic to test the null hypothe-
sis that the sampled values come from a stationary distribution and visual inspected the
trace-plots of the causal parameters (functions of model parameters). We also run multiple
MCMC chains with different starting for each h to evaluate the mixing of the chains using
the Gelman-Rubin statistic (Gelman and Rubin, 1992). The results provided no evidence
against convergence1 .
1We also conducted Bayesian analysis using alternative models with different order polynomials in S as
well as models conditioning only on S (without using the pretreatment variables) and null models, condi-
tioning on neither S nor the pre-treatment covariates. Consistently to results found in Mealli and Rampichini
(2012), higher order polynomials do not lead to substantial inferential benefits, and posterior distributions of
the causal effects of interest did not substantially change with the alternative models, so here we only show
the results based on models conditioning on both S and the pre-treatment covariates.
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Table 3 shows posterior medians and 95% credible intervals for the principal strata
proportions under monotonicity and for the causal parameters τAA,s0 , τCA,s0 , τs0 , for band-
widths ranging from 500 to 1500 euros. The results are robust across different bandwidths.
The estimated proportions of the principal strata are very similar across different h: there
are more than 61% never-applicants, more than 32% always-applicants and less than 6.5%
compliant-applicants. The three estimates for the same causal parameter are also similar.
The posterior distributions of the causal effect for always-applicants, τAA,s0 , and the union
of always-applicants and compliant-applicants, τs0 , are centered on negative values, and
the 95% credible intervals do not cover 0, irrespective of the choice of the bandwidth.
For instance, consider the finite-sample causal effects for the subpopulation within
h = 1 000 euros around the threshold (middle block of columns in Table 3). The esti-
mated τs0 suggests a 13.9% (95% CI: (3.4%; 24.7%)) reduction in dropout rate for the
students who receive the grants. The estimated τAA,s0 suggests an even stronger positive
effect among the always-applicants: a 16.1% (95% CI: (5%; 27%)) reduction in dropout
rate. In fact, τs0 , which is a weighted average of the effects for always-applicants and
compliant-applicants, appears to be diluted by the somewhat surprising small effect among
the compliant-applicant. However, the data do not seem to contain much information on
compliant-applicants (the estimated proportion of compliant-applicants is very small, less
than 5%), and the effects were estimated with large uncertainties.
These results suggest that the current Italian university grants are effective in reducing
dropout from universities among students from families with annual economic measure
around 15 000 euros. Our analysis also reveals some additional information for policy
making. Specifically, always-applicants and compliant-applicants are found to be hetero-
geneous with respect to the effect of the grants. The causal effect for compliers, τs0 , usually
estimated in a standard IV analysis that ignores the application information, is attenu-
ated by the small (and negative) effect estimated for the small proportion of compliant-
applicants. From a cost-effective perspective, it appears more beneficial for education ad-
ministrations to lower the eligibility criteria (i.e., decrease the threshold s0) to allow more
applicants to get the grant, than to increase the amount of the grant to awardees. The combi-
nation of low percentage of compliant-applicants and high percentage of always-applicants
suggests that most students with the economic measure being around the threshold who
intend to apply for the grants would apply irrespective of their eligibility. From a policy
perspective, this implies that educational administrations should better explain the rule of
eligibility to potential applicants to discourage ineligible students from applying, and thus
reduce unnecessary efforts from these students and the administration, for processing these
applications.
5.6. Posterior Predictive Model Checking. Assessing the plausibility of model as-
sumptions is critical in model-based approaches. Model checking here is not as crucial
as in other model-based approaches thanks to the randomization assumption, but it is
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still prudent to check the model fit since there are uncertainties in the selection of Us0 .
We adopt Bayesian posterior predictive checks (Gelman, Meng and Stern, 1996) to as-
sess goodness-of-fit of our models in the application. Posterior predictive checks evaluate
goodness-of-fit of models by measuring the discrepancy between the observed data and
replicated data simulated from its posterior predictive distribution. The particular proce-
dure adopted here is similar to that in Mattei, Li and Mealli (2013, Section 6). Specifically,
we consider three discrepancy measures aim at assessing whether the model can preserve
broad features of signal, noise and signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) in the drop-out status dis-
tribution for compliant-applicants, always-applicants and the union of these two principal
strata, and calculate posterior predictive p−values (PPPVs) to summarize discrepancies
between the observed data and replicated data. Extreme (close to 0 or 1) PPPVs can be in-
terpreted as evidence of lack-of-fit of the model in, at least some aspects of, the observed
data. Further details of the procedure are relegated in Web Supplementary Material.
Table 4 shows the PPPVs for the model-fit to the subpopulation with bandwidth of 500,
1 000 and 1 500 euros, respectively. The PPPVs suggest good model-fit for all bandwidths,
except for a slight under-fit for always-applicants in the subpopulation with h = 500, which
is possibly due to the small sample size. We have also calculated the less conservative sam-
pled posterior predictive p−values (Johnson, 2007; Gosselin, 2011) and obtained similar
conclusions.
6. Discussion. Motivated from the evaluation of Italian university grants, we propose
a probabilistic formulation of the assignment mechanism for regression discontinuity de-
signs and develop a full Bayesian approach to draw causal inference within the framework
of principal stratification. In particular, we illustrate how to utilize information on appli-
cation status to gain additional insights in program evaluation. Applying the method to
the data from two Italian universities, we find university grants reduce dropping out of
higher education for students from low-income families and the effect size is especially
pronounced for motivated students (always-applicants).
The core of the approach we propose is the local randomization assumption (Assump-
tion 4), which is intrinsically non-testable. Therefore, it may be worthwhile to conduct
sensitivity analyses aimed at assessing the robustness of the results with respect to vio-
lations of the local randomization assumption. To this end, we conduct further analyses
deriving the posterior distributions of the causal estimands of interest under three addi-
tional model specifications: (1) a model where we specify the model for principal strata,
πi,g, and the conditional model for potential outcomes given principal strata, fi,gz, condi-
tioning on neither the forcing variable nor the pre-treatment variables; (2) a model where
we specify πi,g and fi,gz conditioning only on the forcing variable, without including the
pre-treatment variables; and (3) a model where we specify πi,g and fi,gz conditioning only
on the pre-treatment variables, without including the forcing variable. Under local ran-
domization, adjusting inference for either the forcing variable, S , or the pre-treatment
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variables, X, should not be required, therefore we expect that results are similar across
different model specifications. Indeed results, shown in Web Supplementary Material, are
robust across different model specifications, suggesting that causal inference under the
local randomization assumption is credible and fully defensible.
A fundamental distinction between our approach and the previous local-regression based
RD approaches lies in the role of the forcing variable in the analysis. Specifically, previous
approaches generally view the forcing variable as a pre-assignment covariate rather than a
random variable as in our approach. As a consequence, the standard overlap assumption,
which requires that there are both treated and control units for all values of the covariates
including the forcing variable, is violated. Violation of the overlap assumption implies that
the conditional independence assumption, which trivially holds in RD settings, cannot be
exploited directly. Instead some kind of extrapolation is required, and in order to avoid
that estimates heavily rely on extrapolation, previous analyses focus on causal effects of
the treatment for units at the threshold. Smoothness assumptions, for example, continuity
of conditional regression functions of potential outcomes given the forcing variable, are
usually assumed to draw inference on those causal effects. Local randomization and con-
tinuity are different assumptions, leading to different causal estimands: under continuity
assumptions units with a realized value of the forcing variable around the threshold are
used to draw inference on causal effects for units at the threshold, whereas under local
randomization, inference is drawn on causal effects for units around the threshold.
In the evaluation of Italian university grants, other than dropout, student’s academic per-
formance (measured by total credits taken or passing rate of exams) is also of great inter-
est in policy. As illustrated by Mattei, Li and Mealli (2013) and Mercatanti, Li and Mealli
(2014), jointly modeling two outcomes, dropout and academic performance in this case,
would be worthwhile for both practical and inferential purposes, and it is at the top of our
research agenda.
After the first year, the Italian university grant assignment rule combines sequential and
RD designs (Cellini, Ferreira and Rothstein, 2010): grants are allocated both on the basis
of students family economic indicator and on the ground of their academic performance
(exam scores above a certain threshold). Such complex assignment mechanisms pose chal-
lenges to causal inference, requiring new structures and assumptions; meanwhile, they also
present great opportunities for extending the existing framework to more general RD set-
tings. One specific direction of our future research is to develop methods that combine
Bayesian tools for RDs and dynamic treatment regimes (Murphy, 2003; Zajonc, 2012) in
the presence of multiple forcing variables (Imbens and Zajonc, 2011).
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Web Supplementary Material: Details of Caculation and Sensitivity Analysis
(http://lib.stat.cmu.edu/aoas/???/???). We describe in detail the Bayesian approach we used
to select the subpopulations, the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods used to
simulate the posterior distributions of the parameters of the models, the posterior predictive
checks, and the sensitivity analysis regarding local randomization described in Section 6.
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Table 2. Posterior probabilities that the covariates have the same distribution between eligible and ineligible students for various subpopulation
h=250 h=500 h=750 h=1 000 h=1 500 h=2 000 h=2 500 h=3 000 h=4 000 h=5 000
Variable (n=528) (n=1 042) (n=1 577) (n=2 108) (n=3 166) (n=4 197) (n=5 159) (n=6 113) (n=8 061) (n=9 846)
Sex .955 .950 .960 .962 .977 .970 .991 .960 .968 .797
High School Type (Baseline: Other)
Humanity .951 .952 .949 .955 .979 .970 .965 .986 .953 .962
Science .894 .905 .926 .927 .951 .889 .916 .926 .045 .000
Tech .790 .807 .790 .808 .819 .619 .751 .793 .003 .000
HS Grade .955 .958 .972 .978 .971 .981 .987 .990 .984 .986
Year (Baseline: 2004)
2005 .932 .964 .954 .926 .973 .977 .976 .983 .861 .918
2006 .883 .918 .914 .909 .959 .934 .952 .970 .807 .884
University (Pisa) .950 .916 .971 .983 .686 .097 .225 .300 .082 .000
Major in University (Baseline: Other)
Humanity .946 .899 .689 .797 .798 .932 .958 .990 .964 .946
Science .894 .857 .660 .751 .783 .901 .929 .966 .911 .913
Social Science .798 .821 .624 .713 .758 .864 .913 .953 .878 .858
Bio-Med .728 .776 .604 .677 .736 .837 .889 .926 .839 .832
Tech .632 .634 .565 .624 .699 .794 .863 .876 .719 .453
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Table 3
Posterior median and 95% credible intervals of principal strata proportion and super-population and
finite-sample causal effects on dropout for always-applicants (τAA,s0 ), compliant-applicants (τCA,s0 ), and their
union (τs0 ), for the subpopulation within different bandwidths h around the threshold.
Population-average Sample-average Population-average at s0
h Median 95% CI Median 95% CI Median 95% CI
h = 500
Pr(Gi = AA) .323 (.294; .355) .322 (.309; .336) .320 (.291; .352)
Pr(Gi = CA) .060 (.031; .105) .041 (.021; .090) .058 (.030; .094)
Pr(Gi = NA) .616 (.570; .650) .637 (.590; .651) .621 (.583; .654)
τAA,s0 −.153 (−.313;−.030) −.152 (−.307;−.038) −.154 (−.298;−.030)
τCA,s0 .045 (−.170; .497) .074 (−.256; .545) .039 (−.169; .474)
τs0 −.116 (−.253;−.005) −.120 (−.265;−.009) −.120 (−.245;−.012)
h = 1 000
Pr(Gi = AA) .336 (.312; .365) .333 (.318; .354) .335 (.311; .363)
Pr(Gi = CA) .043 (.002; .086) .027 (.002; .075) .043 (.001; .075)
Pr(Gi = NA) .623 (.584; .652) .640 (.599; .645) .625 (.594; .656)
τAA,s0 −.161 (−.273;−.052) −.161 (−.270;−.057) −.154 (−.259;−.052)
τCA,s0 .028 (−.745; .828) .031 (−.778; .871) .010 (−.918; .933)
τs0 −.132 (−.242;−.021) −.139 (−.247;−.034) −.128 (−.229;−.020)
h = 1 500
Pr(Gi = AA) .332 (.315; .349) .332 (.326; .337) .329 (.312; .346)
Pr(Gi = CA) .042 (.035; .077) .027 (.020; .066) .042 (.036; .062)
Pr(Gi = NA) .625 (.591; .642) .642 (.605; .644) .628 (.606; .646)
τAA,s0 −.183 (−.286;−.077) −.187 (−.291;−.085) −.153 (−.247;−.063)
τCA,s0 .010 (−.304; .797) .011 (−.207; .928) .000 (−.154; .951)
τs0 −.153 (−.256;−.040) −.165 (−.266;−.057) −.130 (−.217;−.019)
Table 4
Bayesian p−values of signal, noise and SNR under different h for the model used in the application to Italian
university grants.
h Principal strata Signal Noise SNR
{CA} .095 .630 .094
500 {AA} .254 .325 .254
{AA,CA} .338 .273 .370
{CA} .411 .425 .419
1000 {AA} .400 .444 .473
{AA,CA} .493 .335 .518
{CA} .208 .444 .210
1500 {AA} .372 .400 .261
{AA,CA} .455 .337 .470
